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J.

RODNEY JOHNSON

Drafting for the Optimum Marital Deduction

W

HILE the marital deduction provided for by
federal estate tax law may not necessarily be
the controlling factor in planning the will of a married
person, it is certainly one of the most important factors
because of the sheer magnitude of this deductionup to 50% of the adjusted gross estate. 1 A direct
consequence of this importance is reflected in the fact
that the marital deduction has become the most
written-about topic in the estate planning area. Most
of what has been written about this subject can be
divided into the two following categories: ( 1 ) an
explanation of the operation of the marital deduction
or one of its facets; or ( 2) a discussion of how to
obtain the maximum marital deduction through the
use of one of several competing formula clauses.

deduction, as an end unto itself, may be suffering from
a form of estate planner's myopia. They are taking
the position that instead of focusing on the maximum
amount that can be transferred tax-free to the wife,
counsel should recognize that the proper ambit of
his task in the typical case is to maximize the amount
of his client's estate that will end up in the hands of
the ultimate beneficiaries (usually the children) , after
having insured that the wife is adequately provided
for during her life and has the degree of control over
the ultimate disposition of the assets that is consistent
with the husband's plan. What counsel should be seek-

The Maximum vs. The Optimum Deduction
Some estate planners are beginning to suggest that
those of their brethren who find themselves regularly
focusing on this latter goal of maximizing the marital1
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ing then is not the smallest possible tax bill at the death
of the husband. Rather, he should be seeking to
minimize the total estate tax burden imposed on the
husband's assets as they pass from him, through his
wife, to the ultimate beneficiaries. Assuming that the
desired goal is to achieve the lowest overall tax bill
(the sum of the taxes at the husband's death and
at the wife's death plus an interest factor if appropriate), it is quite simple to conclude that instead of
striving for the maximum marital deduction, counsel
should be searching for the optimal transfer from husband to wife-the amount that will "set the stage,"
so to speak, for the lowest overall tax bill even though
it may not take full advantage of the marital deduction.
The Present Practice
Before looking at a possible method of optimizing
the marital deduction it may be helpful to review the
present practice attributed to most estate planners. It
appears that the standard approach of virtually every
draftsman today is to more or less automatically take
the maximum marital deduction except in those cases
where the wife has an estate of her own. In these
latter cases, the conventional wisdom suggests that
she should be given enough of her husband's estate so
that their separate estates will be approximately equal.
How well does this approach work? A recently published study, presenting the results of a computer
simulation of thousands of cases, concludes that this
" ... indiscriminate use of the marital deduction can
nullify all the other estate planning that the taxpayer
has done." 2 The variables used in this study were as
follows:
(a) The size of the decedent's estate was varied
(by increments of $200,000) from $200,000 to

$2,000,000.
(b) The size of the survivor's estate was also varied
(by increments of $200,000) from $200,000 to

$2,000,000.
( c) The after-tax rate of return of the survivor
was varied (by increments of 6%) from 0% to 30%.
( d) The after-tax rate of return of the other beneficiaries was also varied (by increments of 6%) from
0% to 30%.
( e) The remaining life of the survivor after the
decedent's death was varied (by increments of three
years) from one to twenty-two years.
2

Schnee, An Analysis of the Optimum Marital Deduction,
The Tax Adviser, pp, 222, 230 (April 1974).
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(£) The percentages of the decedent's estate transferred to the survivor were 0%, 20%, 40%, 50%,
60%, 80% and 100%.
Varying each of the above factors independently of
the others, the author generated a total of 28,000 cases
and the following results:

( 1 ) The present practice of taking the maximum
marital deduction would have resulted in obtaining
the optimal transfer in only 10% of the cases;

( 2 ) In 55 % of the cases the optimal amount to
have transferred would have been zero; and
( 3) In 21 % of the cases the optimal amount to
have transferred would have been 100%.

A Proposed Solution
Although the author of the above study suggests
some general rules to guide the estate planner in his
search for the optimal trans£er in any given case, it
is believed that there may be a simpler and more accurate way to accomplish this goal. Two of America's
greatest estate planning authorities, W. Barton Leach
and Jam es K. Logan, speaking generally about the
tendency of some testators to make too rigid dispositions and the need for flexibility in an estate plan,
had the following observation to make.
To regulate events in 1980, the judgment of a
mediocre mind on the spot is incomparably
preferable to the guess in 1960 of the greatest
man who ever lived. 3
Capitalizing on this observation, it would seem
that the ideal solution for the present problem is
simply to postpone determining the amount of the
transfer until most of the variables have either become known or at least become estimable with a
greater degree of accuracy. Specifically, counsel would
wait until approximately seven or eight months4 after
the decedent's death to determine how much he will
in fact transfer to his surviving spouse. This postmortem determination is accomplished by leaving the
entire estate to the wife and then allowing her (with
advice of counsel) to determine the optimal transfer
and then disclaim ownership or refuse to accept the
remaining portion of her husband's estate.
3 Leach & Logan Future Interests and Estate Planning,
p. 241 (Foundation Press 1961).

4 This time period is chosen in order to allow sufficient
time after the alternate valuation date has passed within
which to make the decision.

Counsel wishing to structure a will to take advantage of this option will find that it requires very few
changes to his basic marital-deduction will form. He
would begin just as usual, to-wit:
(a) Divide the estate into two shares with whatever formula clause is regularly used, the appropriate
share going into the "Marital" trust and the other
share going into the "Family" trust.
(b) The "Marital" trust will provide that
( 1 ) Wife gets all income for life,
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for
wife's benefit, and
( 3) Wife has an inter vivas and testamentary
general power of appointment over the
corpus with a remainder to the "Family"
trust to the extent that wife fails to exercise her power.
( c) The "Family" trust will provide that
( 1 ) Wife gets all of the income for life,
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for
wife's benefit, but
( 3) Instead of giving wife a special testamentary power of appointment exercisable among the children, she is given an
inter vivas and testamentary general
power of appointment.

Will the consequence of giving wife a general, instead of a special, power of appointment over the
family trust be to cause all of husband's estate to be
included in her estate at her death? The answer of
course is yes-if she accept<> the power. However, the
plan is that she will not accept the power unless she
determines that 100% of her husband's estate would
be the optimal trans£er to her under the circumstances
then existing. If the final computations lead counsel
to conclude that the opitmal transfer would have
been 50% of the adjusted gross estate, she would
simply release her general power of appointment insofar as it allows her to appoint to herself, her estate,
her creditors, or the creditors of her estate. Such a
release (i.e. releasing her general power of appointment into a special power of appointment) has been
recognized in Virginia for over thirty years. 5 Will this
release result in any gift tax liability on the part of
the wife? No. Generally speaking, the release of a
5

Section 55-279(2) (b) Va. Code Ann. (1950).

general power of appointment is treated as an exercise
and therefore deemed a transfer of property. Thus
a releasor of a general power of appointment is ordinarily exposed to a gift tax liability. However, for
almost twenty-five years Virginia law has provided
that the release above suggested would operate as a
disclaimer6 and federal law specifically provides that
" (a) disclaimer or renunciation of such a (i.e. a
general) power of appointment shall not be deemed
a release of such power." 7 Must wife give up her
income interest in order to disclaim her general power
of appointment? Again the answer is no. The regulations state that one may disclaim a general power
of appointment without disclaiming "other interests" 8
and it is clear from a reading of these regulations that
a life right to income would be encompassed in the
phrase "other interests." These same regulations also
recognize the possibility of making partial disclaimers
in those jurisdictions where they are effective under
local law. Virginia law does permit partial releases
and provides that they shall operate as disclaimers if
made before acceptance and within the appropriate
time. 9 Thus if it is determined that the optimal transfer
to wife is 75% of husband's estate, wife would simply
accept the marital trust, her income right under the
family trust, her general power of appointment over
one-half of the family trust, but release (disclaim) her
general power into a special power over the other half
of the family trust. Or, if the optimal transfer is determined to be only 20% of husband's estate, wife
would release (disclaim) her general power into a
special power insofar as the entire family trust is concerned and also over 60% of the marital trust, while
retaining her income rights in both trusts.
Timing Is Critical

Whenever one wishes to make a disclaimer in order
to obtain a federal tax advantage it is necessary to
recognize that, while there may be several limitation
periods involved, one of them-the federal one-is
always going to control the tax consequences of the
disclaimer. Here we have a good example of differing
state and federal rules. Virginia law recognizes an
outer limit of two years in which to disclaim a power
of appointment10 whereas the federal regulations pro6

Section 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. ( 1950).

1

IRC 2514(b).

B

IRC Regulation 25.2514-3 ( c) ( 5).

9

Sections 55-279(2) and 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. (1950).

10

Section 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. ( 1950).

5

vide that " ( i) n the absence of facts to the contrary,
the failure to renounce or disclaim within a reasonable time after learning of its existence will be presumed to constitute an acceptance of the power." 11
It is believed that the seven to eight month time period
suggested above will be acceptable as a reasonable
time and thus keep the presumption of acceptance
from arising. It should be noted that all of the information (e.g. alternate values) will not be available
to the survivor until at least six months after the decedent's death. Therefore, from a practical standpoint,
all that is being envisioned is a one or two month
period within which to make the decision after all of
the relevant facts have been ascertained.

Other Opportunities
So far this discussion has been restricted to a consideration of disclaiming powers of appointment as a
means of trans£erring the optimal amount to the surviving spouse. It should be reasonably clear, however,
that the well-settled Virginia law12 relating to disclaimers of property interests will also allow wife to
disclaim all or any portion of her income interest in
either of the trusts involved. Similarly, in the event
that the estate plan does not call for the use of the
management potential offered by a professional trustee, husband can simply leave his entire estate to wife
outright, with a proviso that any property interest she
might disclaim will pass instead to the children, etc.,
with a contingent trust to serve as a receptacle if
any of the.potential beneficiaries are under age.

Several Problems
While the present practice of giving the surviving
spouse only a special power of appointment over the
family trust may often fail to achieve the optimal
transfer, it does at least guarantee that a portion of
husband's estate will be preserved for the children
except to the extent that the trustee has invaded the
corpus to respond to actual needs of the wife.
The most obvious problem with the plan suggested
herein is its reliance upon action to be taken by the
surviving spouse at a time when her husband's influence is no longer a factor. Counsel might well
advise her that the optimal trans£er is 25 % and
therefore recommend that she disclaim her power
over 75% of her husband's estate. However, there is
11

12

IRC Regulation 25.2514-3 ( c) ( 5).

Sections 64.1-188 through 64.1-196 Va.
(1950).

6

Code Ann.

no way to insure that she will follow his recommendation. She may elect to retain the entire estate with the
ultimate result that nothing may pass to the children.
Whether taking this risk is justified in a given case
will of course be a decision for the client to make after
thorough discussion with counsel.
A second potential problem arises in those cases
where wife may become incompetent concurrent with
or shortly after husband's death and thus be unable
to execute a disclaimer of her power. While this set of
facts is not expected to occur frequently, the careful
estate planner wishing to avoid the possibility of becoming "locked in" in such a case might provide that ·
the general power of appointment over the family
trust is conditional upon wife being able to exercise
it. Language along the following lines should suffice:

In the event that my wife, Jane Deaux,
should be declared incompetent within eight
months after my death without having made
a positive acceptance of the general power of
appointment given her over this Family Trust,
then such power shall terminate and she shall
instead have only a power to appoint the Corpus of this Family Trust among such of my
children, in such portions, outright or in further trust, as she in her last will and testament expressly referring to this power shall
deem appropriate; and in default of exercise
of this power, the Corpus of the Family Trust
shall be distributed as follows:
It is believed that the above clause will result in a
restoration of the status quo, that is, no problem will
have been caused by the giving to her of the complete
power where she is unable to exercise it because it is
taken away from her under these circumstances.13
Is it necessary to take such a conservative approach
in the disability cases? The possibility has been raised
of giving wife's power to disclaim to her guardian,
to be exercised for her if determined in the best interest of the plan, in these cases. In theory this is
quite sound. All that is being done is simply making
a conditional gift of a collateral power of appointment
to her guardian. Generally a guardian would be quite
hesitant to participate in the giving away of his ward's
powers or property. However, where, as here, ( 1 )
13 In order to completely restore the status quo, counsel
would also want to make provision for the trustee to be able
to invade the corpus for the benefit of the children in such a
case. Counsel would not want to make either of these amendments to the marital trust. They would cause the disallowance
of the marital deduction because they would transform Wife's
interest into a "terminable interest" under IRC 2056 ( b).
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CIRCUIT 24-Lynchburg, Waynesboro,
Bedford, Nelson, Amherst,
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Hon. 0. Raymond Cundiff, Judge
Ninth and CCJ1Urt Streets
Lynchburg, Virginia 24504
Hon. Norman K. Moon, Judge
P. 0. Box 96
Rustburg, Virginia 24588
Hon. Robert C. Goad, Judge
Lovingston, Virginia 22949
Hon. William W. Sweeney, Judge
Ninth and Court Streets
Lynchburg, Virginia 24504
CIRCUIT 25-Covington, Lexington,
Staunton, Buena Vista, Clifton
Forge, Highland, Augusta,
Rockbridge, Bath, Alleghany,
Botetort, Craig
Hon. Will.iam S. Moffett, Jr., Judge
Courthouse-South Johnson Street
Staunton, Virginia 24401
Hon. Paul A. Holstein, Judge
Courthouse
Lexington, Virginia 24450

Hon. Roscoe B. Stephenson, Jr., Judge
Courthouse
Covington, Virginia 24426
CIRCUIT 26-Harrisonburg,
Winchester, Frederick, Clarke,
Warren, Shenandoah, Page,
Rockingham
Hon. Duncan C. Gibb, Judge
P. 0. Box 1597
Front Royal, Virginia 22630
Hon. Robert K. Woltz, Judge
County Courthouse
Winchester, Virginia 22601
Hon. Joshua L. Robinson, Judge
Luray, Virginia 22835
CIRCUIT 27-Gala:x, Radford, Pulaski,
Wythe, Carroll, Montgomery,
Floyd, Grayson
Hon. Jack M. Matthews, Judge
Galax, Virginia 24333
Hon. William Southall Jordan, Judge
Radford, Virginia 24141
Hon. R. William Arthur, Judge
Wytheville, Virginia 24382
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CIRCUIT 28-Bristol, Smyth,
Washington
Hon. J. Aubrey Matthews, Judge
Marion, Virginia 24354
Hon. Robert B. Davis, Judge
Bristol, Virginia 24201
CIRCUIT 29-Giles, Bland, Tazewell,
Buchanan, Russell, Dickenson
Hon. Nicholas E. Persin, Judge
P. 0. Box 606
Grundy, Virginia 24614
Hon. Vincent L. Sexton, Jr., Judge
Bluefield, Virginia 24605
Hon. Glyn R. Phillips, Judge
Clintwood, Virginia 24228
CIRCUIT 30-Norton, Wise, Scott, Lee
Hon. M. M. Long, Jr., Judge
St. Paul, Virginia 24283
Hon. Joseph N. Cridlin, Judge
Jonesville, Virginia 24263
Hon. S. W. Coleman, III, Judge
103 Jackson Street
Gate City, Virginia 24251

the ward has no foreseeable personal need for the
property subject to the power, ( 2) the disclaimer is
pursuant to a plan agreed upon by the ward when
she was competent, and ( 3) the disclaimer is clearly
in the best interests of the ward's family unit from a
tax standpoint, there should not be such hesitancy.

into two separate trusts. The essence of the present
plan can be incorporated into that form by simply
changing one word. This change will result in leaving
the portion "open-ended." Instead of giving the surviving spouse a general power over "one-half" of the
trust, she is given a general power over "all" of the
trust. She can then proceed on to determine the
optimal transfer during the post-mortem period as suggested above and release (disclaim) accordingly.

Application To Smaller Estates

Conclusion

One should not infer from the foregoing discussion
that the plan herein suggested is confined to the larger
estates. This concept has potential benefit for any
estate where the marital-deduction will be a factor
and it lends itself to incorporation into the smaller
estate plans just as easily as it does the larger ones.
For instance, in an earlier issue of the ] ournal, 14
a "simple" marital deduction will form was suggested for moderate estates which involved dividing
an estate into two portions of one trust rather than

It is quite possible that the present practice m
drafting for the marital deduction may not be as
dramatically erroneous as the computer study referred
to earlier has concluded. Nevertheless it is submitted
that all those whose practice includes administration
of estates regularly come across estates where far too
much or far too little has been transferred through the
use of standard clauses. It would seem then that, all
other things being equal, it would be incomparably
preferable to leave the determination of the optimal
transfer to those who will be on the spot at the time
for the transfer to occur.

14

Johnson, Simplifying the Marital Deduction, 1 Va. Bar
Ass'n. J. 12 (January 1975).
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